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Abstract: Although Aristotle’s ideal regime discussed in books seven and eight of his 
Politics seems much more feasible and less utopian than the regime outlined in Plato’s 
Republic, a few scholars have questioned its feasiblity in light of the real world demands 
of politics.  Similarly, I argue that carefully considered his ideal regime turns-out not to 
be feasible or a practical recommendation for politics, but rather a thought experiment 
like Plato’s Republic meant to show the limitations of what is politically achievable.  I do 
so by comparing his ideal regime to his prior discussions of democracy in the earlier 
books of the Politics and in particular what he considered the best type of democracy. 
 
Scholars have indicated problems with Aristotle’s ideal regime discussed in books 
seven and eight of his Politics.  It requires conventional slavery, which Aristotle had 
earlier argued is unjust.  It seeks self-sufficiency but ultimately still needs other cities.  It 
is unclear whether it allows for philosophy, or how many, if any, of its citizens would be 
philosophers.  Due to such short-comings, some scholars have suggested that the city, 
despite its seeming real plausibility compared to Plato’s Republic, is ultimately just as 
utopian, i.e. very improbable that it could come into being and equally improbable that it 
could be sustained very long if it did.  Mary Nichols, for example, argues that “its full 
flourishing is impossible” due largely to the unresolvable tension between political rule 
and despotism.1 
I will also argue that the city is a utopia.  Despite the fact that Aristotle makes 
more concessions to the practical demands of politics and necessity, when thought 
through there are simply too many problems to make its sustainability plausible even in 
the unlikely circumstance that it did come into being in the first place.  Thus, like Plato’s 
Republic, in the final analysis, it is a sort of thought experiment meant to show the 
limitations of what can be achieved, or hoped for, in politics.  I will make this argument 
by comparing the ideal regime to Aristotle’s discussion of democracy, which, as far as I 
am aware, no scholar has systematically undertaken.  I think this is the best way to 
approach the argument, because, in a sense, Aristotle’s ideal regime is an ideal 
democracy.  Also, although not pro-democratic per se, there is, arguably, a tacit 
preference of a sort in the Politics for democracy of some kind despite its problems. 
 
I will begin by saying something about Aristotle’s discussion of democracy in 
general and then his explicit discussion of it in book six.  Despite Aristotle’s subsequent 
discussion of democracy in the Politics, his first explicit mention of it in book two does 
not seem very favorable.  There Athens does not come to light as one of the cities he 
considers to be best governed at the present time.  Surprisingly, the best governed city 
turns out to be the barbarian city of Carthage, which does not much resemble a 
democracy (1272b25-42).2  The other two well governed cities Aristotle discusses, Sparta 
                                                 
1 Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle’s Politics (Maryland, Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1992), 164.   
2 It is also worth noting that unlike the other two cities mentioned, Sparta and Crete, 
Carthage has no founder.  Cf. Robert Bartlet, “Aristotle’s Science of the Best Regime,” 
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and Crete, also are not very democratic.  Consequently, the first impression we get is that 
democracy is not a well governed regime.  It is too volatile and susceptible of internal 
change in contrast to Carthage, which merits his praise chiefly due to its stability.  
However, is Aristotle’s reserve about Athens, his absence of praise, really a tacit criticism 
of democracy as such?  I do not think so.   
 Athens was an aristocratic democracy and not, at least by Aristotle’s day, what he 
considered a healthy democracy.  In fact, he later indicates that present day Athens is 
what he understands as one of the least desirable types of democracy (1298b28ff).3  
Athens was no longer the austere polis of Marathonian virtue, the city of Aeschylus’ 
youth.  Owing to the advent of a formidable navy, the once austere city had become more 
like the feverish city that Glaucon desires in Plato’s Republic (372e).  Despite his 
reticence about early Athens, the Athens that emerged after Solon’s innovations and 
particularly after Peisistratus’ tyranny (Athenian Constitution XIII-XV), it is likely that 
Aristotle’s judgment of that early Athens was favorable and very similar to the 
democracy that he later describes as the best (1318b6).4   
 Aristotle next discusses democracy in book three in his discussion of citizenship.  
What is a citizen is disputed from city to city: what is a citizen in a democracy will not be 
the same as in an oligarchy (1275a4).   Nonetheless, Aristotle goes on to seek the citizen 
in an unqualified sense.  He concludes, “The citizen, simply, is determined by no other 
thing than having a share in decision and office (1275a22-24).”5  From this Aristotle 
defines a citizen as those “for whom there is the means to have a share in a legislative 
(bouleutikēs) office (1275b16-18).”6  In this way, Aristotle implies a first, tentative 
definition of democracy: a regime in which all the citizens “have a share in legislative 
office.”   
Why would this tentative idea of a city, and form of government, be more just 
than others?  From the argument made in the opening of the Politics, it best fulfills our 
political nature.  What separates us from the rest of the animals, Aristotle argues, is our 
capacity for reason/speech (logos) (1253a10-15).  This capacity allows and facilitates 
discussion of what is useful and harmful and just and unjust.  Discussion and practice of 
these things brings the polis into being.  It is some sort of agreement about these things, 
i.e. the just and the unjust, noble and shameful, etc., that makes a polis a polis as opposed 
to simply an alliance of some sort (1280a31-37).  Therefore, that polis is best which most 
actualizes this potential in citizens: best or most just by nature, because it best completes 
human nature.  In order for there to be agreement, there must be discussion and 
participation among the citizens.  Therefore, democracy, of some kind, is the best type of 
regime by nature.   
                                                 
American Political Science Review 88 (1994) and Leo Strauss, “On Plato’s Republic,” in 
The City and Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 52-53. 
3 See Andrew Lintott, “Aristotle and Democracy,” Classical Quarterly (Great Britian, 
1992), 120.  Lintott also argues that the four forms of democracy discussed in bk6, ch4 of 
the Politics are historical stages of Athenian democracy (124).  Cf. Gerald Mara, “The 
Culture of Democracy: Aristotle’s Athenaion Politeia as Political Theory” in Aristotle 
and Modern Politics (Indiana: University of Norte Dame Press, 2002), 311-312. 
4 See Lintott 115. 
5 This and all subsequent translations from the Greek are my own from Aristotlelis 
Politica (Lipsiae : In aedibus B.G. Teubneri, 1909).  
6 Some manuscripts read: “legislative and judicial office”. 
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 Aristotle’s next remarks on democracy occur in book four in his analysis of 
different types of regimes or what makes regimes differ.  There he gives a delineation of 
six pure or unmixed regimes: three good and three deviant.  Now, it comes to light that 
there are, in fact, two different types of democracy: one good, which promotes the 
common good, and another which is deviant and seeks primarily the interest of the ruling 
element.  The correct (orthos) one Aristotle calls politeia and the deviant (parekbasis) is 
called democracy (1289a28-30).  Politeia is the Greek word for the form of a city, i.e. 
regime or constitution.7  It makes sense to the extent that democracy is the form of 
government that best fulfills the nature of what a city should be, as explained above, and 
thus would have a name derived from polis: it has the greatest or fullest degree of 
cityness (politeia) owing to the fact that all its citizens participate in the city and exercise 
their capacity for reason (speech) and virtue. 
 Democracy, on the other hand, makes sense as the name of the deviant type.  
Demos means people, but it can have a pejorative connation (and usually does for Plato 
and Aristotle) so as to imply the rabble or hoi polloi.  Kratia means power.  Therefore, 
“democracy” suggests rule by majority will or passion for partisan or self-interest as 
opposed to deliberation about the common good.  However, of the deviant types of 
regimes, democracy, Aristotle argues, is the least bad or “most moderate” (1289b4).  It is 
the most stable of the deviant types, and also presumably the easiest to reform in the 
direction of a good type of regime directed to the common good.  Also, it is the least 
removed from the good form of government of which it is the deviant.  Consequently, 
there is a fine line between the two and perhaps much easier to confuse the one for the 
other than monarchy for despotism.    
 Aristotle turns to a detailed discussion of democracy in book six.  Along with 
oligarchy, democracy is the most extensively discussed type of regime in the Politics.  
This would seem to be for a couple of reasons.  First, as I have argued, some type of 
democracy is the best sort of regime by nature.  Second, as cities become larger they tend 
to become more democratic.  Aristotle doubts whether a very large city could be anything 
but democratic for very long (1286b20-22).  Finally, all actual democracies have some 
element of oligarchy or hierarchy.  A pure democracy is not practically workable. 
 Aristotle begins by noting three things that account for different types of 
democracy.  First and most important is the character of the people, e.g. whether it is a 
farming community, seafaring community, ethnically homogenous or diverse population, 
etc. (1317a23).  Second, is the number and types of offices (1317a28).  This has an 
influence, but should not be unduly considered.  It is the character of the multitude, 
according to Aristotle, that by and large determines the types of offices and institutions 
not the other way around even though citizens of democracies often confuse cause and 
effect thinking that it is their constitution and institutions that make them a democracy.8  
Finally, there is the degree to which it is a mixed regime, has characteristics of other 
types of regimes, which is discussed at various places in the Politics.9  Aristotle discusses 
mixed regimes at length, because most all actual regimes are mixed to some degree.  
Also, mixed regimes are generally more stable than pure ones. 
                                                 
7 It is the Greek word used for the title of Plato’s Republic. 
8 Michael Davis The Politics of Philosophy: A Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics 
(Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), 108-109.  
9 6.5-7, 5.5,5.7,4.4-9. 
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 The type of multitude that makes for the best democracy is a farming multitude of 
common language, ancestry, and ancient or long standing mores and tradition (1318b8-
12).  Common language and ancestry reduces faction, which is one of the chief dangers 
in a democratic regime, and makes the citizens more inclined to identify with and care 
about one another.10  This creates like-mindedness (homonoia), which Aristotle argues 
should be a primary goal of legislators and statesmen in the Ethics (1155a25).  Not only 
does it reduce faction, but it is instrumental, if not essential, for directing citizens to the 
common good as opposed to private distractions and self-interest.   
Mores rooted in tradition are better than written constitutions (1287b4-6).  They 
are more likely to be followed, because they have been long engrained through 
habituation and citizens do not even think of questioning them.11  Consequently, it is 
often detrimental to change customs even if they are bad, because the power of custom 
and law resides more in habit than reason.12 
 Farmers make good citizens for several reasons.  First, they are rooted to the land 
for their sustenance and therefore more dedicated to it than those who do not depend on 
the land.  This means they are more willing to fight and die for it.  In the Ethics Aristotle 
notes that mercenary soldiers are more skilled than militias.  However, ultimately militias 
taken from the citizens are better, because they are willing to stand their ground and die if 
necessary in defense of their country whereas mercenaries run when it becomes clear that 
they are losing and in danger (1116b15-23).  Second, because they are rooted to the land 
they are more mindful of their neighbors and the well-being of their community. 
 The work farmers do keeps them healthy and moderate (sophrosyne) (1318b14-
15).  Farmers are relatively self-sufficient, not dependent on others for their livelihood, 
but their way of life does not create much wealth (1318b12).  This is advantageous 
because it creates a sort of natural equality in terms of property, which is a condition 
necessary for democracy.  This remedies problems that occur from having to establish 
and maintain equality, a middle class or middling element, through laws and 
institutions.13   
Thus, farmers are ruggedly independent, but not arrogant.  They mind their own 
business, but cannot be pushed around.14  Farming is time consuming and farms are 
outside the city.  This means farmers do not have much time for politics.  They are 
content with limited participation: voting and veto power of a sort (1318b20-21).  This is 
good for three reasons.  First, it helps control factions.  Idle hands are the devils 
workshop.  The more time people have to become politically active the more factions 
develop in the city.  Second, although most citizens will have the means for a degree of 
liberal education, few have phronēsis (prudence or political wisdom), the virtue that 
enables one to understand how to bring about the common good in different situations 
(Ethics 1141b12-20).  It is therefore good that most will not desire much share in office 
and political power, since they will lack the skill to govern well.  Finally, wealth tends to 
translate into luxury and vice, which corrupt civic responsibilities.  Aristotle remarks that 
farmers, unlike many other professions, tend to enjoy their work (1318b14).  This 
                                                 
10 1305b38, 6.5, Nicomachean Ethics 1161a10-29, Davis 112, Cf. Federalist Papers 39. 
11 Cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1103b5-10. 
12 Cf. Plato’s Crito 52a1-e5. 
13 On this issue and the problems of establishing and maintaining equality through laws 
as opposed to the character of the multitude see Davis 114. 
14 Davis 115. 
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combined with the fact that they do not make much extra income makes them less likely 
to adopt vices that are harmful to themselves and the city. 
 Finally, and this is the most subtle but arguably most important aspect of an 
agrarian society: it is by nature politically moderate.15  Unlike occupations in cities, 
farming is precarious.  It is subject to nature and chance in ways that technical skills like 
ship-building, shoe-making, and carpentry are not: the weather, the condition of the soil, 
insects, disease, etc.  This means farmers are less likely to be deluded or mislead by the 
power of reason and technical know-how to control politics.  They are more likely to 
think of politics as an art like farming than an art like shoemaking, i.e. an art in which 
human skill and reason exercise some influence, but there remains much beyond human 
control unlike shoemaking where the artisan is in almost complete control of the product 
from start to finish.  In sum, men who have an intimate knowledge of the earth tend to 
have far fewer illusions about man’s ability to control nature (both human and non-
human) than those who “conquer” the world by means of manual craft or abstract 
thought. 
 This means farmers are by their nature leery of change and more rooted in 
tradition.  Per Aristotle’s discussion of law, as mentioned, this is good, because laws and 
political stability in general are largely due to habit and tradition.  Innovation is 
dangerous because it tends to disrupt mores.16  Further, Aristotle suggests that human 
nature itself inclines us to desire change even when it is for the worse (Ethics 1154b28-
32).  Because of the nature of freedom and power of the majority in democracies, 
democracies are especially prone to change more so than other types of regimes.  This 
means the best democracy will be the one that is least prone to change by its nature and 
does not need specific laws and institutions to try to limit and slow change, e.g. checks 
and balances, separation of powers. 
 A second type of multitude that produces a good or stable democracy, but not 
quite as good as farmers, is a ranching community.  Ranchers have many of the same 
virtues as farmers.  For example, their work makes them particularly fit for military 
service (1319a23-24) and does not incline them to the hubris of technical laborers.  
However, it differs from farming in two respects.  First, ranchers are not as rooted to the 
land: ranching is like a moving farm (1256a34).  Thus, they are not as tied to, therefore 
concerned about, particular communities and neighbors.  Second, ranching has more 
potential to create wealth and therefore a greater tendency towards oligarchy.  Horse 
breeding is more characteristic of ranches, and owning horses is characteristic of 
aristocrats.  Extra wealth translates into luxuries, which erode virtue and result in 
unnecessary and potentially detrimental (both to oneself and the city) vices.17  Further, as 
mentioned, wealth tends to make citizens arrogant (Rhetoric 1384a3-7) and also gives 
them more leisure to participate in politics as opposed to minding their own business like 
farmers.  Thus, large ranching communities tend to transform into oligarchies unless 
there are laws and mores that inhibit this tendency. 
                                                 
15 I owe this observation in particular, as well as others noted above, to Davis 114-115. 
16 This is true of technical innovations as well as political, e.g. consider how cell phones 
have changed the mores of those growing up with them.  Also, there is the problem of 
increasing power without a concomitant increase in practical wisdom (phronesis).   
17 Consider the transition from the city of utmost necessity to the feverish city in Plato’s 
Republic. 
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 After discussing these two good or stable types of democracy, Aristotle discusses 
two deviant forms of democracy.  The first is a commercial multitude: the majority of 
citizens no longer earn their living from farming but move to the city and become wage-
earners.18  This way of life loses the virtues of farming.  First, the work is not as 
intrinsically pleasant or satisfying as farming: Aristotle, to some extent, anticipates 
Marx’s theory of alienation of labor.  Second, their labor is not as time consuming as 
farming and there is potential for greater profit.  These factors make them more likely to 
adopt vices: they have the extra time, money, and are looking for distractions from their 
work, which they have easy access to because they live in the city.  This makes them 
more intrinsically restless.   
Combine this with the fact that most will engage in technical professions that lack 
the moderation of farming.  They will be more inclined to believe in progress, since 
technical skills are always advancing.  Consequently, they tend to believe similar 
progress can be made in politics, that human reason and ingenuity can control politics 
beyond what may be prudent and practically feasible: city dwellers are politically 
progressive, more inclined and eager for change.  This progressive demeanor has a 
tendency to overturn mores and lead to the final type of democracy.  However, as long as 
mores remain relatively unchanged and the population of a common language and 
ancestry, there will still be some sense of a common good and devotion to it. 
 Nonetheless, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to stop a commercial democracy 
from changing into what Aristotle calls a final or ultimate democracy, which is the most 
precarious or unstable type (1319b1-30), in the long run.  This occurs due to the 
increasing population of a commercial democracy and the continual demand for greater 
profits and more affluence.  This stems from the nature of commercial democracy itself, 
as mentioned, i.e. a way of life that is not intrinsically pleasant pursued as a means to an 
end, not a way of life or end in itself.  Citizens seek fulfillment in recreation, which 
requires more and more money.  Citizenry expands to include foreigners as new markets 
are sought for goods.  Requirements for citizenship are lowered to admit more and more 
people (1319b8-10).  At the extreme, the criterion of citizenship breaks down, foreigners 
and natives alike are given equal rights.19   
The population becomes more diverse, which creates more faction and eventually 
dissolves a sense of common good.  Rapidly changing mores disrupt civic responsibility 
and family life.  There is no longer order in the household (1319b28-29).  Eventually, the 
native population declines, because citizens forego having children to spend their money 
on themselves.20  Aristotle goes so far as to describe this final type of democracy as a 
tyranny (1292a17-18).21 Let me turn now to Aristotle’s ideal regime and see how it 
compares with what he has said about democracy.   
 
                                                 
18 Arguably, this is the transition America made in the 1920s, e.g. the restlessness and 
agitation of bourgeois life depicted in Lewis Sinclair’s Babbit.  Cf. de Tocqueville, 
Democracy in America “Why the Americans Show Themselves So Restive in the Midst 
of Their Well-Being” (Vol. 2, Sec 2, Ch13). 
19 Cf. Republic 563c-d. 
20 Cf. Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, Bk36.   
21 Cf. de Tocqueville’s description of the Tyranny of the Majority, Democracy in 
America Vol.2, pt.4, sec.6-7. 
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 It is debatable whether “the regime we would pray for”, or Aristotle’s best city, 
discussed in books seven and eight is more like a democracy or an aristocracy.  On the 
one hand, citizenship is very restricted.  On the other hand, all the citizens do take turns 
ruling and being ruled.  Scholars considering it an aristocracy point to the restricted 
nature of citizenship and the city’s dependence upon servants and skilled laborers 
(banausoi) who are not themselves citizens.22 However, by Aristotle’s own definition of 
democracy, it nonetheless is principally democratic, since the servants are not technically 
part of the city.  Further, regardless of wealth or family lineage “all citizens have the 
same chance of being allotted high or low office.”23   
Nonetheless, despite its democratic features, it is at first surprising how different 
it is from the best type of democracy discussed in book six.  Yet, when carefully 
compared to the farming democracy, I think it proves to be more similar to it than other 
types of regimes Aristotle discussed.  Still, by considering how different it is, we see its 
problems and ultimate unfeasibility.     
 In a sense Aristotle accentuates the positive features of the farming democracy 
and seems, at first, to negate the negative aspects by making it aristocratic.  All citizens 
are exempted from toil so as to devote themselves wholly to moral virtue, the condition 
and character necessary for ruling and being ruled in turn.  The virtues that a farming way 
of life instilled in citizens are replaced by a rigorous civic education with great attention 
and emphasis given to the liberal arts, particularly music.24  This substitution has two 
goals.  In part, the intention of this education is greater homonoia (like-mindedness), 
which Aristotle says in the Ethics should be the chief goal of legislators, than that which 
farming brought about.  This homonoia goes beyond the sake of the necessary: reducing 
faction and maintaining regime stability.  It seeks, rather, to reconcile, as much as is 
possible at any rate, the tension between the private good and the public good, the good 
of the city and good of the individual.  Consequently, this city will be more socialist than 
the farming democracy.  While still owning private property, they will largely share it 
with each other, something made easier since the citizens in general will be wealthier and 
less needy than the farmers of a farming democracy.  The ideal regime seeks much more 
than the agrarian democracy to make the good person and good citizen one and the same, 
since, as Davis argues, “Good farmers do not make good men”, despite what virtues they 
have.   
 The second and more important goal is to introduce an element of contemplative 
virtue in the form of music and poetry, which was absent from the farming life.  This 
seems to be the main problem with farming and the farming democracy if one considers 
it in light of the Nicomachean Ethics: it did not allow the leisure and wealth necessary for 
the contemplative life, philosophy in particular, Aristotle concludes is the best at the end 
of the Nicomachean Ethics.  Philosophy and the contemplative arts come to fruition in 
commercial, Periclean Athens.   
                                                 
22 Thanassis Samaras, for example, argues that it is a “clear-cut aristocracy”.  “The Best 
City in Aristotle’s Politics”, Philosophical Inquiry Vol 25, No 3-4 (2003).  Cf. Stephen 
Salkever, Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 34.  
23 Richard Kraut Aristotle: Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
227. 
24 Music in Greek means the arts and sciences governed by the Muses, e.g. epic and 
tragic poetry.   
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The problem, however, is that the contemplative life, particularly the life of the 
philosopher, is not simply compatible, but, in fact, somewhat at odds, with the life 
devoted to the good of the city and civic duty, a problem that comes starkly to light in the 
Republic when Glaucon baulks that it is most unjust to force the philosophers, the best of 
the citizens, to go back into the cave and rule (519d).  The virtue of the philosopher or the 
virtue that constitutes the most happy life is not explicitly political but more of a private 
nature.  It is the more or less solitary activity of contemplation, shared, perhaps, with a 
few friends, that characterizes the best or most choice-worthy way of life, not the busy 
and tumultuous life of the politician.   
Why, then, would it be good that the citizens participate in politics aside from the 
necessity of having to do so like the philosopher-kings of Plato’s Republic who must take 
turns doing so but will spend most of their time philosophizing (520d)?  I think there are 
two reasons.  First, Aristotle, like Plato, recognizes that there are innately different 
capacities and dispositions, which is reflected in the Noble Lie in Plato’s Republic.  
Consequently, not all citizens will be equally capable and satisfied by the solitary, 
contemplative life that Aristotle concludes is the best in the Ethics.  Nonetheless, 
Aristotle still seems to think it is the best way of life to the degree it is pursued even in 
mitigated form.  Participating in the legislative process, since it is a contemplative 
activity of a sort, does give a share of the best way of life to all the citizens to some 
extent.  It makes them more inclined to at least one form of contemplation, aside from 
music, than they would otherwise engage in if left to live simply as they please.   
 Also, this particular sort of contemplative activity is good for them and the city.  
It is good for them, because it forces them, to a degree, to think beyond mere self-interest.  
They must consider what is good for the community as a whole, albeit as it relates to their 
own good, an act which in itself fosters moderation and self-restraint in the same way that 
constructing a city in speech in Plato’s Republic moderates Glaucon’s personal and 
private sensual desires for material goods and tyranny.  This, in turn, is also good for the 
city, because it fosters a citizen body that is more moderate and inclined to restrain their 
private concerns and self-interest for the sake of the common good.   
 Second, the city as a city simply cannot foster exclusively, or even primarily, the 
highest sort of contemplative, solitary activity, which is revealed to be the most choice-
worthy way of life at the end of the Ethics.  Its well-being and very existence depends 
upon more mundane, utilitarian forms of planning and contemplation, those that require 
discussion, cooperation, and compromise with other citizens.  At any rate, this, I would 
suggest, is why philosophy is not explicitly mentioned in books seven and eight.  Rather, 
contemplative virtue must be introduced in a diluted form that is politically salutary, i.e. 
will not disrupt but can contribute, to a degree, to civic virtue and more egalitarian in 
nature than philosophy.  This turns-outs to be music and poetry, particularly epic poetry 
about heroes and civic virtue.     
 This sort of leisure activity, watching tragedies and listening to music excites 
certain passions and performs a cathartic function: it dispels passions, to an extent, that 
are disruptive to the household and city, e.g. anger, pity, fear, jealousy.  This is of great 
importance because the leisure the citizens have creates much more opportunity for 
faction and turmoil, opportunity that the farmers did not have because they were too busy 
working.  Thus, the elimination of work, while granting the opportunity for more 
education and greater commitment to virtue and the common good also creates conflict 
with it: more leisure and resources make the citizens more likely to realize and 
distinguish between their own good and good of the city, a problem that was suppressed 
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in the farming community due to the necessity forced upon them by meager means, i.e. 
the necessity of depending and looking to the good of the city and the lack of time to 
consider the tension between their private good and the public.  Thus, music attempts to 
be the remedy of the problem caused by leisure and is in that sense its purpose.  Davis 
remarks, “Music, then, keeps us from breaking up the home; it substitutes simulated 
motion [war, domestic strife, etc.] for real motion.”25   
 Despite the dangers of leisure, it does allow the possibility of the philosophic life 
for the few suited and inclined to it by nature.  Consequently, in a sense Kraut, in 
contradistinction to other commentators, is correct that the ultimate goal of the best 
regime is the philosophic life.26  However, Kraut thinks that equates to the life of the 
intellectual as opposed to philosopher in the strict sense of the word.  That, I think, is 
precisely the problem: a few, if not most, will not be satisfied with the life of the 
intellectual: their leisure will disrupt and ultimately destroy the city.  It is in this sense, I 
think, that it is the regime we would pray for, i.e. it is doubtful that music can really 
successfully fulfill this function: leisure will probably end-up destroying the city. 
This becomes clear when comparing it more closely to the farmers.  First, these 
citizens will not be as naturally politically moderate as the farmers and thus more inclined 
to change and innovation.  While they will not be as susceptible to the illusion that 
technical skill can conquer chance and nature as craftsmen who practice it every day, 
they nonetheless will not work with and be subject to the vagaries of nature the way 
farmers will.  Second, and more important, although their education is liberal, it is not 
effeminizing like modern liberal education: these citizens are not modern men.  It must 
emphasize, both in physical training and music, martial virtues due to the political 
necessities of the ancient world, i.e. constant threat of war.  The music will emphasize 
epic poetry and heroic deeds: there is no mention of the extensive revision of Homer 
made in the Republic, and even there philosophers do not really reduce the emphasis on 
martial virtues.  The army must be a citizen militia, and because the city cannot or should 
not be very large, they must be formidable fighters like the Spartans. 
Thus, it is no surprise that in Aristotle’s discussion of the three correct and three 
deviant regimes in the Ethics the counterpart of democracy, the good democracy, he calls 
not a politeia, as he does in the Politics, but a timocracy (1160a35).  Timos means honor.  
Therefore timocracy is a regime whose guiding principle is the pursuit of honor.  In other 
words, the best democracy is a democracy whose chief principle is not freedom, but 
rather where freedom is subordinated to the higher principle of honor.  Why honor and 
not virtue?  Because honor is an easier, more egalitarian and thereby more achievable 
public substitute for virtue.  The citizens of the best regime are not philosophers, but 
music loving soldiers.  Virtue is more difficult to cultivate and more difficult to judge.  
Honor as a principle requires mainly just military virtue, which is easier to achieve.  Also, 
it mitigates against the negative undercurrents that cause democracy to become a deviant 
form of government, e.g. fear (military training cultivates courage) and materialism 
(soldiers lead austere lives, learn to do without material comforts, and somewhat look 
down upon them as unmanly and effeminate).   
However, there are problems with timocracy.  For one, as we see in Sparta, it is 
hostile to philosophy and holds no place for the contemplative virtue that must in some 
sense characterize the best regime.  More importantly, it is expansionist: you gain honor 




by valor and conquest in battle.  Thus, the young citizens, especially, will push for war 
and expansion even given the potential loss of property, since all citizens must own 
property on the outskirts.  Further, although Aristotle wants to make the city independent 
of others as much as possible, he, nonetheless, chooses to locate it near the sea so as to 
have a port and all the advantages of maritime trade of which wealth would be one.  
Thus, the city will not really be independent in the final analysis, but must deal with other 
cities and face the question, sooner or later, of whether to rule or be ruled by them, as 
Sparta and Athens had to.  Finally, the leisure their wealth and servant population gives 
them, will make them restless, especially the young, and their music education cannot 
help but heighten their desire for battle, again especially in the young, who will have 
more leisure, presumably, because they will not have the political duties of their elders.  
In fact, on-going conflict and periodic battle of some kind may be necessary to restrict 
leisure.  This becomes clearer by examining its precondition: freedom. 
Freedom is understood by Aristotle in two ways, because there are two different 
types of freedom in popular regimes.  “One freedom is having a share in ruling and being 
ruled (1317b1).”  It is the freedom to hold an office and to have a say in the affairs of the 
city, which is an essential part of being a citizen in the best regime.  Another meaning of 
freedom is “to live as one wishes” (1317b12).  The first type of freedom is a condition 
that facilitates cultivating and practicing moral virtue.  The second type of freedom is 
desirable for the leisure necessary for the contemplative life outlined in book ten of the 
Ethics, but otherwise dangerous and potentially disruptive.  Given the choice, i.e. 
freedom to live as one wants, few will pursue virtue, as Aristotle argues at the end of the 
Ethics and Socrates makes explicit in his critique of democracy in book eight of the 
Republic.  Hence, these two types of freedom are actually at odds with each other: civic 
duty is not the same as living as one wants.  When the second type of freedom becomes 
more important than the first, civic duties are neglected and liberty degenerates into 
license: politeia becomes democracy.  It is unlikely that their liberal education will help 
much in preventing this for two reasons: the citizens are not philosophers or even 
intellectuals, as Kraut argues, but primarily soldiers.  Consequently, the education is not 
pleasant for them, per se, as it seems learning and philosophy in particular are for the 
potential philosophers in Plato’s Republic.  Some, if not most, will prefer physical 
exercise, and the excitement and potential honors of war. 
For all these reasons, Aristotle’s ideal regime seems unworkable in practice.  
When he says it is the regime we would pray for, he means not that it could actually exist, 
but that it could not, which is why divine intervention would be necessary to make it 
work.  And, yet, if I, and other scholars who argue along similar lines, am correct in 
thinking Aristotle does not really believe his ideal regime could exist, as Kraut and others 
think, why is he not more clear about it, like Socrates in the Republic who ultimately 
admits that it does not matter that the kalipolis could not exist on earth, but “there is a 
pattern for it laid in heaven” that the philosopher lives by.   
Here, I can only suggest that I think Aristotle leaves open the hope that a better 
regime can exist, because hope is necessary for all political reform for the better.  Just as 
the city needs courageous soldiers to defend it, and thus must to some extent promote the 
illusory honors of war, so it needs courageous statesmen who work for reforming bad 
regimes and maintaining good ones, or good elements of existing regimes.  Not every 
citizen can or should be made aware of the ultimately unsatisfying, not to say tragic, 
nature of politics and political action in this world in the final analysis.     
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 Thus, I have argued that Aristotle’s ideal regime is a utopia (ou topia), something 
that can literally not exist.  Despite the fact that it seems quite a bit more plausible than 
Plato’s Republic, in the final analysis, it too shows the limitations and tragic nature of 
politics: the impossibility of resolving the tension between the individual good and good 
of the city and the demands of justice in this world.  This came to light by considering 
Aristotle’s prior discussion of democracy in the Politics, since a popular government of a 
type, as I have argued, is the best by nature, and the ideal regime is a democracy of a 
type.  In particular, by comparing his ideal regime with what he considered the best sort 
of democracy, the agrarian democracy, we have seen how the ideal regime attempts to 
correct the short comings of the farming democracy by introducing wealth, a servant 
population, and thereby leisure and liberal education, which in turn allow for greater 
homonoia and opportunity for the contemplative life. 
 Yet, when examined these improvements undermine the regimes’ stability and 
feasibility.  Their wealth and lack of work with nature and the earth will make them more 
restless, arrogant, and immoderate.  Their liberal education cannot help but entice them 
into war and the potential honors that go along with it.  In fact, war may be necessary, 
and therefore expansion and empire, simply to prevent being ruled by another city and 
more importantly to prevent freedom from degenerating into license and neglect of civic 
duty and the common good.  It is too much to ask of their liberal education that all or 
most of the citizens will use their leisure well, i.e. for peaceful, contemplative pursuits as 
opposed to directing it toward internal or external conflict, internally would be pushing 
for ever more freedom, a chief characteristic of democracy in Socrates’ critique of it in 
book eight of the Republic, and creating factions.  Thus, the regime must be one we 
would pray for, because it could never exist by chance, nature, or reason, but would 
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